Limitation of using pull-only or push-only approaches

Pull-only interventions are not ideal in displacement contexts, as they risk excluding less market-ready groups, such as refugee and host communities. The cost of push-only strategies requires significant investments in training, asset transfers and coaching. The limited scale and low value for money might also be issues: the larger the target group that needs to be reached, the bigger the investment required.

Interventions that are more push than pull

Owing to operational and technical challenges, many of the value-chain interventions implemented in the PROSPECTS countries have focused more on the supply side of the labour market – with “push” interventions (capacity-building and technical training, distribution of seeds and grants, construction of infrastructure, etc.) often delivered through direct support, in collaboration with implementing partners – rather than influencing how markets can work to deliver such support. There are four key reasons for this: 

• pull interventions require heavier support and more capacity-building efforts;
• push interventions are more familiar to project staff, as they are somehow aligned with more “traditional” development and humanitarian practices;
• push interventions show quick results and so are easier to measure;
• push interventions are easier to plan and manage, especially for resource-stretched teams.

Time taken to demonstrate impact

Push and pull approaches do not “meet in the middle” of the market system at the same time. For instance, the off-taker needs some certainty that scale and quality criteria will be met by the growers, so that the off-taker can supply its buyers with high-quality produce in sufficient volumes. The growers and producer groups also need some certainty that their goods will be taken by the off-taker and that they will be paid accordingly. There can be a sequencing problem that may take a few years to iron out: stimulating the pull side in the absence of sufficient supply means off-takers may lose confidence in the system, while oversupply in the absence of sufficient off-takers means growers and producer groups do not receive the profit they had anticipated. This is further complicated in refugee-hosting areas, where off-takers and buyers were not previously present and thus had not yet established trust.

Additional barriers to refugee inclusion

One of the key challenges in developing agricultural value chains that are inclusive of refugees is land rights and ownership. As shown in the examples from Sudan and Uganda, refugees did not have access to land ownership, so establishing a value chain required negotiation on land use with members of the host communities. Long-term and sustainable solutions require policy change over land rights, but in the short-term, programme teams helped facilitate access for a small cohort, on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, refugees are often limited with regard to the sectors in which they are legally allowed to obtain work permits, and in terms of practical access to land that’s close enough to their settlements so that they can travel to seek or perform work.

Market distortions

In times of crisis, other INGOs started to introduce free-of-cost goods and services and employed cash grants. While such measures might be necessary in times of crisis, they do distort the market over a longer period after the crisis, making it more difficult to develop a market for a good or service that was at one point subsidized.

Need for great agility

Common contextual challenges among the cases presented include lack of access to productive inputs, limited capacity to produce at scale, distance to markets and lack of financial capital. Each context shaped how these challenges affected the target group, and how push and pull approaches were developed to respond to them. Because the situations in PROSPECTS countries are relatively volatile, changes were more frequent and unexpected.